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THE LEAGUE OF

~ATIONS

\ND THE LAWS OF WAR.

lNTRODUC'l'ION.-Everyone would agree that the renovation of international law presents a problem of commanding importance. Diversity of
opinion is manifested, however, as soon as attention is directed to the details
of the renovating process. Where to begin, what to emphasize, and how to
-go about it are questions which provoke a medley of discordant answers.
Out of this medley a few paramount issues are beginning to emerge. One
such issue concerns the so-called law of war. What shall be done about it?
The World War revealed its lack of sanction, its confusion with self-interest,
its chaotic uncertainty. Can it really be elevated to the dignity of law?
There are excellent jurists who believe that it can and that the result will
be worth the effort Others are skeptical. The following paper is without
doubt one of the most illuminating and significant discussions of the subject
which has appeared up to the present date. It was first published less than
a year ago in the British Year Book of International Law. It has attracted
a great deal of attention in Great Britain, and some attention, although not
so much as it deserves, in this country. It is reprinted in this issue of Tut
MICBIGAN LAW Rsvrr:w, with the generous permission of the Editors of the
Year Book, and also of the publishers, Henry Froude and Hodder & Stoughton, in the hope that a real service may be rendered by affording it wider
publicity among those whose opinions wi11 weigh heavily in influencing the
decisions to be made.-THt EDITORS.

HE second of President Wilson's famous Fourteen Points stipulated for the "absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas
outside territorial waters, alike in peace and war, except as the seas
might be closed in whole or in part by international action for the
enforcement of international covenants."
On this point the Allied Powers in agreeing to the Fourteen
Points as the basis of the terms of Armistice made special and definite reservations. Perhaps for this reason the freedom of the seas
never became an issue at the Peace Con£erence. But at one time it
nearly did so; and the question is one· which is still sometimes discussed, and which will certainly be raised again in the near future.
It is worth while, therefore, to consider more carefully exactly
what this second point as defined by President Wilson really meant.
First, it may be pointed out that the absolute freedom of the seas
in time of peace is agreed to by every one, and has been effectively
acted upon for a century at least. Second, "the closing of the seas
for the enforcement of international covenants by a League of Nations" is similarly agreed to, and was embodied by the Peace Con-
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ference in Article 16 of the treaty. The establishment of the supplementary international law which is required for this purpose, if any
is required, is in principle at least a simple matter. Therefore, the
controversial matter on which President Wilson by his second point
wished to establish legally defined rules is narrowed down to the
law. of "private" war at sea: the meaning of his point is merely this,
that he wished to set up a code of rules for the conduct of wars between individual states undertaken without the sanction of the
League. In other words, if the second point had been acted upon
it would have been necessary for the Peace Conference to rewrite
a large chapter of the laws of war, in exactly the same manner as
had been done by the Hague Conference in 1907, and as the Conference of London attempted to do two years later.
A similar ·but more general proposal, emanating from a weighty
source in this country, deserves attention. In his book written in
·1918, Lord Phillimore proposed that the amendment of the laws of
war and the provision of some meq.ns for their enforcement should
be part of the work of the Peace Conference, and that when these
new rules were completed they should be inserted into the final
treaty. He made this proposal, to quote his own words, "for two
reasons; first, to make war when it does occur less intolerable than
the present war has beeµ; secondly, to prevent war by taking away
from some nations the temptation to rely on their superior capacity
of committing atrocities ·as an element of success in war." Lord
Phillimore's proposal had no more success than President Wilson's
second point as an issue at the Peace Conference; but the idea on
which both were based, that it was essential for the future that the
laws of war should be rewritten by an international authority of
high standing, has not yet been abandoned. The proposal now
takes the form that the League of Nations should take up the question and should continue the work of the Hague Conferences, by
devoting its attention to the codification of rules for the conduct of
military operations. The latest exponent of this idea is Mr. Winston Churchill, who recently said in the House of Commons that the
use of poison gas in future warfare is a question which should be
regulated by the League.
In view of the history of the Hague Conferences, and of the high
authority behind the proposals which have been quoted, it is worth
while to examine carefully the motive ideas of Lord Phillimore, who
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states the proposition more generally and more clearly than any one
else has done.
An attempt will be made to consider these ideas, and the conclusions deduced from them, from two different points of view ; first,
in relation to the facts of modem warfare and the nature of modem
intercourse between nations ; second, in relation to the history of
.the laws of war and the historical traditions of international jurisprudence. An attempt will also be made to draw from the considerations put forward certain conclusions as to the future action of
the League in connection with the subject under review.
I

It must be said at once that Lord Phillimore's motive ideas seem
to spring from a misconception of the whole character of modem
war. In the first place, it is almost inconceivable that any nation
which is contemplating a declaration of war would be prevented
from declaring it by conventional limitations on the use of force
agreed to in any international code of rules. The only possible case
is that of Great Britain had she accepted President Wilson's second
point as it stood. But, in fact, if wars between individual states continue, no such sweeping limitations of force will be agreed to, for
they are contrary to the nature of war. In the second place, it is a
complete misconception to imagine that any future war between
great Powers (which is the sort of war to which the rules must be
adapted and which really is the only sort worth consideration) can
by any laws whatever be rendered "less intolerable" than the late
war. War is intolerable in proportion to the destruction of life and
property it affects, and it is certain that if wars between individual
states continue they will become not less destructive but more so.
This is a necessary consequence of the application of science to warfare, and cannot be prevented except by the prevention of war itself.
Any future war will be incomparably more intolerable than the late
war has been.
This last point may perhaps be carried a little further. As the
scale of war increases it becomes not merely the function of an
army or a navy but an effort of the whole of society, so its hardships and horrors must spread to every class of society. The use
of violence against women and children, especially at sea, caused
great indignation during the late war, but clearly women and chil-
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dren working in a munitions factory are a legitimate object for
bombardment, and so are the encampments of Women's Auxiliary
Forces. Similarly, the increase in the number of aircraft and in the
size of bombs already developed makes it certain that in the next
big war the destruction of whole towns by aerial bombardment, as
complete as their destruction now is by artillery, will be allowed by
any rules of war that are likely to gain acceptance. Such destruction will. make the life of the civilian population of a belligerent
state very much what the life of the soldier in the trenches has been
in the last five years. Moreover, without exception the most effective weapon in the late war was the starvation by blockade of the
whole civilian population of enemy countries. It is certain that if
wars between individual states continue, the belligerents will not
give up this weapon. It is therefore a platitude accepted by every
military thinker that no rules can prevent any future war from damaging civilian populations infinitely more than they were damaged
during the late war.
There is a further vital difficulty connected with the protection of
neutrals in any future war petween individual states. Modern war
being an effort by th~ whole of society, the whole activity of society,
including all trade with neutral states, contributes to military success. Belligerents have the strongest interest to stop. the whole of
such trade by their enemy. No law defining neutral rights could be
devised that would not be broken whenever a belligerent felt strong
enough to break it. It is for this reason and owing to the international interdependence of interests from which it springs that any
future war will, like the past one, tend to become universal, and it
is for the same reasons that the neutrals have shown such a striking
willingness to accede to the League of Nations.
If, then, the codification of the laws of war can by the nature of
modern warfare do nothing to better the lot of civilians or to render
war generally less intolerable than it has been, and if such <:odification will not really help either to prevent the outbreak of war or to
protect the interests of neutral states when it has broken out, the
drawing up of such rules would seem prima facie to be both a thankless and a barren task. Fortunately, the Peace Conference decided
after slight hesitation that it was not a task that it was worth while
to undertake. The Conference was right in judging that little good
could coJlle of any attempt to establish rules which would require
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a most effective League of Nations for their maintenance before the
League itself had been established. And even now that the League
has been established there are other general considerations which
make it equally doubtful whether the League can any more usefully
occupy itself 111 codifying the rules of war than the Peace Conference could do.
For example, it may well be doubted whether any rules which
could at present be devised would really be adequate to the conduct
of the next war. The whole nature of warfare alters with the progress of invention, and in accordance with that change of nature
the law, must change too. The late war demonstrated nothing more
clearly than that the law of sea warfare as it stood in 1914 would
have been, even had it been observed, totally inadequate to the operations which it should have controlled. Similarly, no rules of warfare at sea drawn up in 1920 could be adequate to the naval operations of 1940. The future of the hydroplane and of the submarine
as weapons against me;chant shipping, and that of the aeroplane
as a carrier of contraband, are by themselves problematic enough
to make even the attempt to devise such rules almost certainly unfruitful. And there is this further consideration= if a fixed code
of rules were to be drawn up by the League of Nations, and if subsequently invention were to change again the nature of warfare,
the fixed code of rules which had been established would be worse
:than none, for no rule which was contrary to the nature of war
would be observed, and a rule that is not observed only serves to
discredit the law, and to drag other nations into" a quarrel from
which they might have kept clear.
There is a further reason, and a most important one, why the
codification of the law of war is a task which it is most difficult
for the League of Nations to attempt. Almost every question connected with the laws of war is necessarily controversial, and for
the last half century has become increasingly so. But there is no
part which is so controversial as the relations between belligerents
and neutrals. Yet this is the centre of the whole code of the law
of war at sea. If there are not rules effectively to -control the relations of belligerents and neutrals there is no law of war that is
worth consideration. Even before the last war this was a subject
on which agreement was exceedingly difficult to secure. The whole
matter was discussed at the Hague and parts of it again at the Con-
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ference of London in 1909. The rules which were thus laboriously
evolved were afterwards rejected by the very Governments which
drew them up. At the present time, so far as sea warfare at least
is concern!'!d, there are hardly any accepted principles from which
discussion could even begin. "It has become apparent," Oppenheim
wrote in a private memorandum in 1917, "that international law
concerning the rights of neutrals in sea warfare is entirely unsettled." The extreme divergence of the views which would be put
forward if the subject were raised is illustrated by the fact that
many people in Great Britain would wish not only not to extend
the rights of neutrals in the sense proposed by President Wilson,
but would on the contrary wish to denounce the Paris declaration
of 1856. The fact of the matter is this, that the interests of a belligerent with sea power are so sharply in conflict with those of neutrals that probably no settlement could be arrived at which would
be generally accepted.
The first general proposition which is here put forward is that
the Governments of the world who have combined to establish the
League of Nations would make a· disastrous mistake if they proposed to use the new machinery which they have set up to solve
the old problems connected with the codification of the laws of war.
';l'he task with which the League of Nations should deal is rather
the building up of a new body of international law for time of
peace. There are innumerable problems of international life, innumei:able conflicts and coincidences of national interest for which
an effective body of law is required. It is hardly necessary to mention the questions of communication, transit, of colonial policy, of
public health, of labour legislation, and of the settlement of disputes for which international law has hitherto failed adequately to
provide, but which cannot any longer be avoided.
The second contention which is now put forward, and which will
be examined further in the second part, is that the failure of international law to provide solutions to the problems of peace has been
at least in part due to the fact that the attention of writers and
statesmen has always been diverted from the law of peace to the
law of war. This preoccupation with the law of war has not only
diverted attention from the difficult, but infinitely more important
problems of peace, it has also rendered comparatively barren efforts
at international "legislation" which might have led to the best re-
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sults. There is al$o at least a case for thinking that it has undermined the whole moral force of international law in the minds of
people at large. A law, of which the most discussed and the most
conspicuous part, and of which it was often erroneously asserted
that the only "real" part, was the law of war, could not command
much popular respect. Every war produced violations of its rules,
~nd even more allegations that they had been violated. These violations left the injured party with no sanction but that of reprisals"of no use unless you are the stronger side," as Lord Phillimore has
said. For these reasons Westlake (Collected Papers, p. 238) holds
that the rules that control hostilities are the worst and weakest
part of international law; and yet it is by this worst and weakest part
that international law ha& always been popularly judged and discredited.
Of all this, the most unfortunate result is that this diversion of
attention from the law of peace has left that law seriously inadequate to the subject matter it should control. The League of Nations must not delay in taking up the task which this inadequacy
throws upon it. For in the view taken in this paper it is the chief
task of the League to remove this inadequacy, and by the development of true legal processes, and by the establishment of the authority of international covenants and law in time of peace, to work
out a stable system for the world.

;a;
An attempt will now be made very briefly to sketch the historical
background of the two main contentions put forward in the first
part, namely, that the preoccupation of writers and statesmen with
the laws of war has been a real obstacle to the progress of international law, and that it is by the development of the law of peace,
rather than by renewing the attempts to codify the law of war, that
a stable international system can be built up by the League of Nations.

*

*

*

*

It was the great work of Grotius which first established the predominance of the laws of war in the study and eXposition of international law. That Grotius himself should have thought the laws
of war of paramount importance is explained by the motive which
made him devote his labours to "the noblest part of jurisprudence."
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That motive he thus explains: "I, holding it to'be most certain that
there is among nations a common law of rights which is of force
with regard to war and in V>'.ar, saw many and grave causes why I
should. write a work on that subject. Ftlr I saw prevailing throughout the Christain world a licence in making war of which even barbarous nations would have been ashamed; recourse being had to
arms for slight reason or no reason; and when arms were once
taken up all reverence for divine and human law was thrown away,
just as if "men were thenceforth authorised to commit all crimes
without restraint." (Whewell's Translation, Preliminaries, par. 28.)
Grotius' motive, then, in laying the foundations of the modern
law of nations was to mitigate the horrors of the wars which in his
_day ravaged Europe. It was natural, therefore, that the scheme
of his book (Preliminaries, pars. 32-5) should show war as the
basis or the source of almost all his reflections and studies. It was
this characteristic of his book which established among exponents
of jurisprudence the tradition, which has survived 'to the present
day, that the chief function of ~temational law and the sphere in
which it achieves most indisputably real "positive" existence, are
both to be found in the laws of war.
The reasons why this tradition was established so firmly, and
has endured so long, are the following. In the first place, Grotius
achieved a brilliant success in the object for which he wrote. Not
only did his work have a great lite.rary success, but it was the cause
of an immediate and permanent improvement in the practices of
war. The atrocities of the Thirty Years' War were not reproduced
in the wars of the next two centuries after he wrote ; and war being
then conducted by small armies, the misery it inflicted when those
armies regulated their conduct in accordance with his rules of humanity, was very greatly reduced. This positive success made the
moral force of the laws of war loom very large in the minds of
jurists, statesmen, and peoples.
Secondly, the enormous personal authority of Grotius himself
caused most of his successors to follow closely the path he had
marked out. His work in itself was so much better and so much
more complete than anything that had preceded it, and than· almost
anything that came after it for a very long time, that his authority
remained almost decisive, and even yet is not without weight. And
his indirect influence has been even greater than his direct authority.
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For he wrote as a scholar and a lawyer, but he achieved the work of
a statesman ; and throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the weight of his own words was reinforced by that of innumerable mediocre writers, not without fame in their own day, who
were content to paraphrase and reproduce what he had created.
Thirdly, there is this important fact to remember: that in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the relations between nations
in time of peace were very much more infrequent and unimportant
than they are today. Their relations through war, whether as belligerents or neutrals, were a very much larger part of the whole of
their intercourse than such relations are in the twentieth century.
It was natural, therefore, that the law of war should present itself
as the most important subject for legal regulation between states
to all who concerned themselves with international relations.
These causes established the Grotian tradition so securely that it
dominated the growth and development of international law throughout the nineteenth century. That it should have done so was contrary to the essential facts of the nature of international society, and
contrary to the dictates of reason: for all the three causes above
described ceased in the nineteenth century to hold good.
In the first place, in the nineteenth century, war so increased in
scale and in destructiveness, that the contribution made to human
welfare by the laws of war, while still considerable and ·by no means
to be discounted, was yet negligible compared to what it had been.
The rules of Grotius in his own day enormously reduced the suffering caused by an outbreak of war; but their efficacy was reduced by
the inventions and development brought by every decade of the last
century, until today no rules can prevent war from being infinitely
more intolerable every time that it occurs.
In the second place, the authority of no one classical writer
should in the nineteenth century have exercised the decisive influence which Grotius, directly or indirectly, exercised on international
law. There was a great body of literature, and a great number of
jurists who studied it; there was a large amount of custom and
usage; there was material for great progress in the science and practice of international law, had there been a modern Grotius to effect
it-some one with a great statesman's view of international law and
with a great statesman's power of gaining acceptance for new conceptions and new obligations. It was against reason; therefore,
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that the Grotian tradition should have continued to dominate the
science of international law.
In the third place, the improvement of communications and the
growth of international commerce and exchange so intensified the
intercourse between nations that their war-relations became comparatively an insignificant part of the whole". This growth of intercourse demanded a corresponding growth in the international law
of peace-a growth which, had it been adequate, would have rendered the law of war comparatively insignificant. But it was not
adequate; there was a growth of law indeed, and much of the 1r.creased ·intercourse was regulated by Convention; but the law of
peace lagged far behind .the requirements it should have fulfilled,
and the growth of interests and opinion which it should have reflected.
This last-mentioned shortcoming was the more remarkable in
that the. nineteenth -century added to custom and reason as sources
of international law, the method of international "legislation" by
Conferences of States. This began at the Congress of Vienna and
developed fitfully until Hague Conferences devoted themselves exclusively to the work of codifying and creating law to govern international relations. This method of legislation latterly became the
most important source of international law ; it was certainly the most
spectacular, and had it produced good results, it might have added
enormously to the legal value and to the moral authority of international law.
It might have been expected that this method of ''legislation"
would have produced attempts to deal by general rules with the great
problems that absorbed the energies and attention of the whole
world during the nineteenth century. There was material enough
for law: the extraordinary development of colonisation in uncivilised parts of the world, the growing international solidarity of economic interests, the increasing cost and destructiveness of war, and
the consequent increasing importance of preventing its outbreak,
were all matters that seemed to demand the creation of rules. And
in fact attempts were made to deal with them by Conference Legislation. The problems of colonisation produced some declarations
about the slave trade, and much later some discussion of native
rights and some regulation of colonial traffic in arms and liquor.
The problems of commerce produced rules about the common rights
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of the Society of States over international rivers and inter-oceanic
canals-though in the development of these rules Conference Legislation played a smaller part than might have been expected. The
problem of war produced some rules of doubtful value about recourse to mediation, and some machinery established at the Hague
to secure the peaceful settlement of disputes.
· But the principles underlying these rules were never worked out
by the Conferences that enunciated them; they were left to develop
by the slow growth of custom-or not to develop, as the case might
be. It was the Grotian tradition that really dominated the use 0£
Conference Legislation. As against the meagre and spasmodic
treatment just indicated of the great problems of peaceful intercourse, the method of Conference Legislation was used to codify,
confirm and amend drastically and repeatedly the laws of war on
sea and land. The following list of Conference Conventions on the
laws of war may be compared with the sparse "peace" results above
referred to1856. Declaration of Paris on Maritime Law in time of war.
1864. Declaration of St. Petersburg forbidding the use of certain
arms.
1868. Geneva Convention for the protection of the sick and
wounded.
1868. Geneva Convention :-Additional Articles.
1906. Geneva Convention :-Amendment and extension.
1899. "Peace" Conference at the Hague: one Convention dealt
with the peaceful settlement of international disputes;
two Conventions and three Declarations dealt with the
Law of War.
1907· Second "Peace" Conference at the Hague: two Conventions dealt with the Law of Peace, eleven Conventions
and one Declaration dealt with the Laws of War on
Land and Sea.
1SJ09. Declaration of London on the Laws of War at Sea.
It is perhaps worth while to inquire why the method of Conference Legislation was applied with so much more persistence and
thoroughness and apparent success to the law of war than to the
infinitely more important problems of the law of peace.
Westlake explains the amelioration of the laws of war by the
operation of two moral forces. "The cause of this rapid career of
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improvement," he writes, "must be something more than the renewed belief in a commonwealth of mankind which has been mentioned above- as marking our time. * * * Along with the renewal
of that belief there has come a remarkable development of the sentiment of pity, ·of an enthusiasm of humanity which has caused a
wider and keener sympathy with suffering than has perhaps ever
before been known" (Collected Papers, pp. 278-9).
Now it may be remarked that both these moral forces might have
found their expression in the improvement of the law of peace
quite as logically as in that of the law of war. "A renewed belief
in the commonwealth of mankind" and an "enthusiasm of humanity" might both have led to legislation for :the better treatment of
native races or to international legislation for the improvement of
labour conditions, or to laws for the prevention of war. Indeed, it
is remarkable that they did not. For there were other moral forces
at work in the nineteenth century tending in the same direction.
There was, for example, the wave of philanthropic feeling which
swept England on the subject of the slave trade. And there was a
widespread and persistent desire, springing from the renewed belief in the commonwealth of mankind and attested by the repeated
recourse to settlement of international disputes by-arbitration and
by the calling of the Hague Conferences, to improve international
law for its own sake, to regulate international relations on the basis
of justice, and to build up a legal system which would replace force
by law as the final arbiter of nations.
But all these forces were swept into the improvement of the laws
of war. When they touched any concrete problem of international
peace relations they led usually to the enunciation of some broad
general principle; but this principle was not worked out into a comprehensive and practical system of law. Take, for example, the
treatment of native races. In Annex 15 of the Treaty of Vienna
· there was a·general declaration against the slave trade, which was
condemned then as now by the conscience of the civilised world,
and during the nineteenth century the same moral forces led ·to the
abolition of ·slavery in various parts of the world. Not until the
Berlin and Brussels Acts, however, was the principle of the Vienna
Declaration even discussed internationally again. And then it led
to some international Conventions, the inadequacy of which has
been illustrated by the whole of subsequent African history. This
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failure cannot be attributed to the lack of moral forces-Westlake
himself is witness that they existed. Nor is it due to the fact that
problems of colonial administration did not attract the attention of
statesmen-in fact, every government with colonial possessions was
perpetually preoccupied with such problems. Nor is it due to the
lack of a real interest to be served-international agreements on the
lines of the mandates now proposed might have done much to promote the true welfare of both white men and their native subjects.
Westlake attributes the failure of international law to deal more
effectively with the slave trade to the prevalent exaggerated idea of
national independence (Peace, p. 323). This is another way of saying that it was due to a failure to apprecia;te the true function of
international law. Statesmen and lawyers did not envisage the uses
of international law for the prevention of suffering and abuse in
time of peace; and Westlake's moral forces were diverted to endeavors to prevent abuse in time of war.
Similar illustrations may be taken from other parts of the history of international relations in the nineteenth century. The Congress of Vienna laid down a fundamental principle as to the rights
of non-riparian states on international rivers. This principle indeed has had much recognition and some development during the
last hundred years. But no international Conference has ever endeavored to "legislate" for its extension to straits, canals, ports and
railways. Yet if the principle were valid in one sphere, it sh9uld
have been extended to the others ; and the immense growth of international commerce might have been expected so to extend it. Such
extension would have been in the interests, not of landlocked states
only, but of every state in the interdependent community of nations; it is an extension which the League of Nations will have to
bring about and which it has indeed already begun to consider.
Again, Article 8 and Protocol 23 of the Treaty of Paris of 1856
introduced into international law certain rudimentary rights of mediation by third parties in disputes which threaten an outbreak of
war. These rights were much used in connection with the Eastern
Question; Sir Thomas Erskine Holland has much of interest to say
about them. But they were scarcely mentioned in International
Conferences until 1899; and neither Hague Conference gave them
any substantial development. Yet one of the basic facts of international society was that a war between two states was of vital inter-
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est to other states. Had the system of Conference Legislation been
used as it might have been used, it would have so developed the
rudimentary principle of 1856 that third parties would have been
given not only an absolute right, but even a duty, to meditate and
to enforce consideration and delay before any individual state threw
international society into confusion by declaring war. Surely the
prevention of war was as true ?-n international interest as the prevention of abuse during war, and surely it was one which called as
urgently for agreed regulation by Conference Legislation. Yet it
is only after the Great War that those principles have been embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations which should have
logically developed from what was recognized and enshrined in a
treaty sixty years ago.
Had international law developed as it is above suggested that it
might have done, it is conceivable that the Great War might have
been averted; it is even conceivable that the League of Nations
might have come about by evolution instead of revolution. The
failure of international law is due to many a powerful cause; no
law. can outstrip the moral standci.r-Os of the mass of those who are
subject to it. But, in part at least, it is due to the failure of the
statesmen and jurists of the last century to use the moral forces of
their day for the development of international law along the lines
of true progress; and this in turn, it has been argued, is due to their
preoccupation with the laws of war. It is for the statesmen and
jurists of our day to bear this lesson continually in mind, and to
.apply it in the use they make of the new international machinery of
the League.

